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STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION




William V. Dorsaneo II1*
N employment discrimination cases based upon the Civil Rights Act of
18661 and title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 courts generally have
* B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Texas. Assistant Profes-
sor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). The current statute, derived from Law of April 9,
1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, is the Civil Rights Bill of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16
Stat. 144. The section provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
When title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. H8 2000e to 2000e-17(1970), was enacted the equal rights provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 was not
understood as providing a private remedy to an aggrieved employee or applicant for
employment. However, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968), the
Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), derived from § 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, prohibited "all racial discrimination, private as well as public." It is now
clear that § 1981 applies to private job discrimination based on race and is not limited to
acts under color of state law. Sanders v. Dobbs House, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). The
enactment of title VII did not preempt or repeal by implication the remedy for
employment discrimination that previously existed under § 1981. Boudreaux v. Baton
Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971). The weight of
authority indicates that unlike title VII, § 1981 is limited solely to claims based upon
allegations of racial discrimination and not to claims premised upon religion, national
origin, or sex discrimination. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 482 F.2d 535(5th Cir. 1973); Held v. Missouri-Pacific R.R., 373 F. Supp. 996 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
Aliens as well as citizens are protected as long as they are lawfully within the United
States. Mohamed v. Parks, 352 F. Supp. 518 (D. Mass. 1973); Guerra v. Manchester
Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. 88 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970). Title VII creates a private right of
action against employees, employment agencies, and labor organizations when the
employment relationship becomes tainted with racial discrimination. Johnson v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974). The private right of action has
been characterized as a method of ensuring that the discriminatee may be made whole by
an award of back wages and injunctive relief. Id. at 1367, 1375; accord, Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 801-02 (4th Cir. 1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1972); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719-20 (7th Cir.
1969). The language of title VII indicates that an award of back pay is within the
sound discretion of the district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970). The
Supreme Court has recently held that awards of back pay should be refused only if the
central statutory purpose of eradicating discrimination aind making persons whole for
injuries suffered through past discrimination would be frustrated and that the employer's
good faith is not a sufficient reason for denying back pay. Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 45 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1975).
The discretionary powers of the district court in the area of back pay awards is
considered "equitable" rather than "legal" and, therefore, a party may not demand a jury
trial in title VII cases under the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution.
See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974). Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion
in Albemarle recognizes the legal foundation of title VII actions and indicates that jury
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accorded statistical evidence great,- if not decisive, weight. The relevance
of statistical evidence is premised upon the legal principle that a statistical
demonstration of the unequal consequences of a particular employment
practice or selection process establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. 4
Statistical evidence has been utilized to show that a particular standard or
qualification for employment or promotion results in selection of applicants
for hire or promotion in a percentage or ratio pattern which differs signifi-
candy from the minority configuration of the labor pool.5 Courts have also
trial may be available if subsequent opinions render awards of back pay relatively
automatic. 95 S. Ct. at 2385-86,45 L. Ed. 2d at 312-14.
Title VII prohibits discrimination based upon an individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin by employers, employment agencies, or labor organizations. 42U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970). The statute permits differences in standards of compensation
or terms and conditions of employment based upon a "bona fide seniority or merit
system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to
employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). However, seniority systems have been struckdown where their use effectuates the perpetuation of past discrimination. See Bing v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972). See also
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971), where the
court stated: "To be preserved, the seniority and transfer system must not only directly
foster safety and efficiency of a plant, but must also be essential to those goals . . . . If
the legitimate ends of safety and efficiency can be served by a reasonably available
alternative system with less discriminatory effects, then the present policies may not be
continued." Similarly, the statute permits an employer to "act upon the results of anyprofessionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action
upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). The use of tests or
educational criteria which select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern
significantly different from the racial pattern of the labor market places the burden upon
the employer to show that the test or other employment criterion is job related and that
an alternative device, without similarly undesirable racial effects, could not have been
utilized. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 2375-76, 45 L. Ed. 2d 280,300-02 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 29 C.F.R. § 1607(1975) provides guidelines for employers seeking to determine whether employment tests
are job related. The Albemarle Paper Co. opinion appears to have adopted theguidelines formulated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as the
measuring standard for employment tests while at the same time not precluding the
application of different validation techniques. 95 S. Ct. at 2378, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 304.See also Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974);Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).3. Ochoa v. Monsanto Co., 335 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd per curiam,
473 F.2d 318, 319 (5th Cir. 1973). The court indicated that a showing of statisticaldisparity with respect to an employer's racial employment pattern constitutes a primafacie case, thereby shifting to the defendant "the burden of going forward with exculpa-
tory evidence." 335 F. Supp. at 58. See Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 586(5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 371 U.S. 37 (1962). See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.202 (1965); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1966); Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII,
59 VA. L. REv. 463 (1973).
4. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (emphasis added),
where the Court stated: ". .. Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the conse-quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." See also Watson v. City
of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963). Title VII provides immunity for an employer who
engages in conduct "in good faith, in conformity with, and in reliance on any writteninterpretation or opinion of the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission." 42U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b)(l) (1970); see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 95 S. Ct. 2362, 45L. Ed. 2d 280 (1975). However, see Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 519 F.2d 527 (9th
Cir. 1975), where the court held that good faith reliance is relevant only to liability forback pay and other damages, and does not bar declaratory or injunctive relief or an
award of attorney's fees.
5. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973). See alsoGriggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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acknowledged the relevance of statistical data showing a disparity between
the percentages of members of minority groups hired or promoted and the
percentages of minority groups in a judicially selected available population. 6
The subtle character of many discrimination producing factors in the em-
ployment process requires the courts to place heavy reliance upon statistical
evidence.7
Despite the importance of statistical evidence, courts have provided only
minimal guidance concerning the method and manner of its use. Certainly,
a determination of whether minority group members are proportionately
represented in an employer's work force or in labor union membership
requires an identification of the available population to be used as the base
for making comparisons and drawing conclusions. Nonetheless, workable
guidelines for selection of an available population from which statistics are to
be taken in order to gauge the performance of a defendant charged with
unlawful discrimination have not been clearly expressed. Moreover, the
permissible extent of a statistical disparity between a defendant's employ-
ment pattern and the evidence derived from an analysis of the available
population has not been articulated. The premise upon which this Article is
based is that courts should utilize precise standards and statistics in selecting
the available population to be used as the measuring rod of the defendant's
performance in employment discrimination cases. Consequently, this Article
explores the current use of statistical evidence and suggests approaches
which it is hoped will be of some use in subsequent proceedings.
I. STATISTICAL DATA AND THE PLAINTIFF'S PRIMA FACIE CASE
It has been stated that each claimant seeking relief from discrimination
has the burden of showing that his employer intentionally discriminated
against him on account of his race, religion, sex, or national origin.8 In this
connection, a claimant must shoulder the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie caseY Once a prima facie case has been presented, the burden
of producing exculpatory evidence is upon the defendant. 10
A. Individual Claims
The basic method by which an individual claimant may present a prima
facie case is by showing that (1) he belongs to an identifiable minority
6. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 225 (5th Cir. 1974).
See also Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 53 (5th Cir. 1974);
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). The concept of
the "available population" has also been described as the "relevant labor market." See
Note, supra note 3, at 469. See generally Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38
U. CH. L. REV. 235, 268-81 (1971); Note, An American Legal Dilemma-Proof of
Discrimination, 17 U. Cm. L. REV. 107 (1949).
7. Badillo v. Dallas County Community Action Comm., Inc., 394 F. Supp. 694
(N.D. Tex. 1975). See also Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir.
1975).
8. Andres v. Southwestern Pipe, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 895 (W.D. La.), aff'd per
curiam, 446 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1971); Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp.
603 (E.D. La. 1969).
9. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
10. Id. at 802.
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group; (2) he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (3) he was rejected despite his qualifications; and
(4) after his rejection the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of the same qualifications." The
claimant need not show that the employer had a subjective intent to
discriminate. 12 Moreover, an employer's good faith is not a defense to a
finding of discrimination or an award of back-pay to the discriminatee. 13
To rebut the claimant's prima facie case the employer must demonstrate the
existence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the rejection of the
employee. In the foregoing instance, the claimant's prima facie case does
not require introduction of statistical evidence. However, statistical evidence
may be used by the rejected applicant to show that the employer's asserted
legitimate non-discriminatory reason was in fact a cover-up for a racially
discriminatory decision.' 4
Where the sought-after position is filled by a competing applicant a more
difficult case is presented. The employer may hire the best qualified
applicant,' 5 and the claimant may demonstrate a prima facie case by
showing that he was better qualified. Where the claimant can demonstrate
ability equivalent to the person hired, but not superiority, the claimant may
introduce statistical evidence that the rejection conforms to a general pattern
of discrimination against persons belonging to the claimant's minority group.
This evidence will usually take the form of a statistical presentation of the
employer's overall minority employment pattern. The purpose of the statis-
tical evidence here will be to show that minority group members are, in fact,
not treated equally. The courts reason that a significant unexplained
disparity between the percentage of persons in a particular minority group
employed or placed in a selected employment category by the employer and
the percentage of that minority group in the available population is unlikely
to have resulted from a neutral process of selection.', In short, although the
employer is not required to hire a less qualified minority applicant, he may
be precluded from rejecting an equally qualified minority applicant where
the claimant can make an unrebutted statistical demonstration that the
employer's overall minority employment pattern is discriminatory."
11. Id.
12. Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975); Baxter v.
Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974); Bolton v. Murray Envelope
Corp., 493 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1974); Peters v. Missouri-Pacific Ry., 483 F.2d 490 (5th
Cir. 1973).
13. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
14. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973).
15. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Corp., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
16. Ochoa v. Monsanto, 335 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
17. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972). One author has suggested that even the "best
qualified" defense will not suffice if the individual claimant is able to demonstrate an
overall discriminatory employment pattern. See Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense,
and Law in Labor Relations: Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 27 RUTGERS L.
REV. 675, 687-88 (1974). Professor Blumrosen questions the authority of Jacksonville
Terminal Co., citing Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973). Nevertheless, it is submitted that the "best
qualified" defense is still valid, assuming the qualifications are both necessary and job
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B. Individual Claims in the Context of Class Actions
The foregoing analysis presumes that the standards and qualifications for
employment selected by the employer are not being questioned. When the
applicant for hire or promotion contends that a purported objective qualifica-
tion is discriminatory in effect, statistical evidence is integral to the claimant's
prima facie case. In this context, the individual claim takes on many of the
characteristics of a class action. Where the employer requires that all
employees fulfill a particular requirement, the discriminatee may contend
that the requirement is artificial in the sense that it is not a necessary
prerequisite to the tasks the applicant qua employee must perform while
functioning as an employee. Where statistical evidence can be marshalled to
show that the designated qualification has a more severe impact on minority
applicants than non-minority applicants, the individual claimant who is
otherwise qualified will present a prima facie case.' 8 The employer must
then produce evidence that the requirement is job related and necessary' 9 or
rebut the claimant's statistical evidence by showing that the requirement does
not, in fact, have discriminatory consequences. 20 Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.,2' a class action case, illustrates the method of showing the discriminato-
ry effect of a particular employment requirement. The employer required a
high school diploma and a satisfactory intelligence test score for certain jobs
previously limited to white employees. The 1960 census for North Carolina
reflected that 34 percent of the white male population completed high
school, as compared to only 12 percent of the Black male population. The
high school diploma requirement, therefore, altered the racial pattern of the
available population in a manner which artificially reduced the percentage of
Black males. The employer failed to justify the requirement of a high
school diploma as necessary.
A showing that a particular practice, policy, or employment standard gives
rise to a minority employment pattern which is disproportionate to the
percentage of that minority in the labor force is a relatively simple undertak-
ing if the particular practice, policy, or employment standard is identifiable
and if population data reveals who is adversely affected by the requirement.
The statistics concerning the number of persons by race who have high
school diplomas are readily available in United States census data and are
computed for delineated geographic areas.
Where the employer has a particular requirement which cannot be directly
evaluated for the effect it produces upon minority applicants by reference to
related. Furthermore, Jacksonville Terminal Co. appears to this author to be authorita-
tive, despite Professor Blumrosen's interpretation of Williamson.
18. See Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
19. See Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 354 (5th Cir. 1972): "The
only justification for standards and procedures which may, even inadvertently, eliminate
or prejudice minority group employees is that such standards arise from a legitimate
business necessity." Business necessity means more than serving legitimate management
ends. In order for a practice to be a matter of business necessity it must be essential in
the fulfillment of those ends, not merely a matter of management convenience. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
20. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also Sexton v. Training
Corp. of America, Inc., 2 E.P.D. 110216 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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census data, the analytical problems are exacerbated. An evaluation of the
employment tests used by an employer to determine whether they produce
discrimination is difficult because the number of persons who have taken the
test will usually be small and not necessarily representative of the persons in
the relevant labor pool. Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher22
illustrates this problem. The court, in considering the impact of a test used
by the Boston fire department, compared the percentage of minority appli-
cants who passed the test with the percentage of non-minority applicants who
passed, and concluded that the statistical evidence was inconclusive. How-
ever, other statistical evidence indicated that less than one percent of the
Boston fire department was Black or Spanish-surnamed and that Boston had
a population of at least sixteen percent Black or Spanish-surnamed Ameri-
cans. The court considered the inconclusive test results in the context of the
overall minority employment pattern of defendant and held that plaintiffs
had presented a prima facie case. Therefore, the employer had to justify
the discrepancy. Defendant attempted to validate its test requirement and
failed. Therefore, although the employer is not required to justify the use of
practices which cannot be shown to produce discriminatory consequences,23
the overall employment performance of a defendant may be used to buttress
the plaintiff's evidence that a particular practice has discriminatory conse-
quences.
The cases in which a particular policy or practice of an employer has been
challenged for the discriminatory effect which it allegedly promotes can best
be viewed as cases in which the employer has imposed unnecessary and,
therefore, illegitimate discrimination producing limitations upon the selection
of the available population. 24
In summary, to present a prima facie case an individual claimant must
prove that he is qualified for the position. In this connection, a claimant
may plead and prove that the qualifications selected by an employer result in
discriminatory consequences, thereby requiring the employer to justify them
as job related and necessary. Statistical evidence will be required to prove
that a particular requirement for hiring or promotion results in unequal
consequences. Similarly, proof that an employer's announced standards for
the promotion, hiring, or rejection of the employee are mere pretexts for
discrimination will normally require introduction of statistical data evidenc-
ing an employer's general pattern of discrimination. An individual claimant
cannot, however, present a prima facie case by statistical evidence alone.
C. Class Actions
An individual claimant may also bring the action as a class action pursuant
22. 371 F. Supp. 507 (D. Mass. 1974).
23. Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1974).
24. See Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D.
Mass. 1969), where the court found that a prima facie case had been established by a
showing that certain required aptitude tests were discriminatory in effect. Of the 300
Blacks who took the test, only 20% achieved scores high enough to be in a position to
receive jobs, while 75% of the whites scored in the job-qualified range. Id. at 1358.
The court, nevertheless, decided on other grounds that relief was not merited.
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to federal rule 23.25 The claimant as class representative must establish
that the action meets the requirements of rule 23(a). 26 However, this rule
is construed liberally in the context of suits based upon title VIP 7 and
section 198128 because suits brought under the employment discrimination
statutes are considered inherent class actions. 29  Moreover, the failure of the
individual claimant to establish a violation of the equal employment opportu-
nity statutes in connection with his own case does not preclude the courts
from concluding that the defendant discriminates against the class of minori-
ty group members represented by the individual claimant.30
Where a particular employment practice is challenged by the class repre-
sentative as a discrimination producing variable in the employment process,
the method of using statistical evidence to present a prima facie case wil not
differ from that used in individual cases where particular practices are
challenged. The class representative will not, however, be required to show
that each class member is otherwise qualified for employment.3 1
It has recently been held, however, that the plaintiff class may establish a
prima facie case by statistical evidence of the defendant's overall employ-
ment performance and by such statistical evidence alone.8 2  The method of
evaluating an employer's overall employment performance is set forth
succinctly in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.:33
The courts have based a finding of adverse impact on data showing the
percentage . . . hired as compared to the percentage . . . in the avail-
able population. The statistical disparity is held to create a prima facie
showing of discriminatory impact and thus invokes the requirement that
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) sets forth the prerequisites to a class action:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) its claims or defenses of the representative par-
ties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the repre-
sentative parties will fairly and adequately represent the class.
26. Rossin v. Southern Union Gas Co., 472 F.2d 707, 712 (10th Cir. 1973);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
29. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968); Jenkins v.
United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968); Oates v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
30. See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir. 1970).
31. Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 55 (5th Cir. 1974).
32. Id. at 53. The plaintiffs stipulated that the defendant's driver hiring practices
were not discriminatory; therefore, no particular practice or policy was brought into
question. This was despite the fact that the defendant-employer had imposed an
experience requirement which effectively foreclosed minority group members from
becoming road drivers. Irrespective of the stipulation, it is clear from the opinion that
the court considered the experience requirement discriminatory. See Bing v. Roadway
Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973) (past intentional discrimination constitutes
another factor which supports the conclusion that statistical evidence is probative);
United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972) (defendant's use of
referral service for new employees in an inconsistent manner disfavoring minorities held
to support inference of discrimination); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th
Cir. 1971) (departmental seniority system embodied in collective bargaining agreement
held a practice having discriminatory effect). With respect to seniority systems, see
Note, Last Hired, First Fired-Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1544 (1975).
33. 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
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the job relatedness of the overall selection process be established
34
An analysis of the racial configuration of the employer's work force is
required where the Pettway standard is implemented. The method has
frequently been used by the courts.35
If the class representative shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant
by showing a statistical disparity between the minority configuration of the
employer's labor force and the available population, the defendant will be
required to identify the non-discriminatory cause or causes of the disparity to
rebut the prima facie case. Thus, the importance of formulating precise
standards for -the selection of the available population is increased in the
class action context.
II. SELECTION OF THE AVAILABLE POPULATION
Analysis of the case law reflects that only minimal consideration has been
given to the selection of the available population. The courts, in a number
of cases, have given little clue as to the population to be utilized. 6 In at
least one case the appellate court was compelled to take judicial notice of the
percentage of the particular racial minority in the available population, as
there apparently was no evidence in the trial record on the matter.37
A. Geographic Limitations
The cases may be classified on the basis of the geographic boundaries
selected in defining the available population. In many cases it has been
assumed that the geographic boundaries of the available population are
congruent with the particular metropolitan city in which the employer's
business is located. 38 Courts have also utilized the geographic boundary of
the county in which the enterprise is situated.8 9 Other cases have utilized
the geographic boundary of the state40 or region 41 where the enterprise or
labor organization is located. Nevertheless, the courts have provided very
little guidance with respect to the proper method of selecting the available
population, even on a geographic basis.
34. Id. at 225 n.34.
35. See Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d
112, 120 (5th Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971); Boston
Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1017 (lst
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
36. See Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 357 (5th Cir. 1972);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 795-96 (4th Cir. 1971).
37. See Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970).
38. See, e.g., Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v.
Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 550 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507 (D.
Mass.), aff'd, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
39. See, e.g., Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.
1972).
40. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970).
41. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
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There have, however, been a few cases in which the selection of a
particular geographic area has been disputed. In Johnson v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co.42 the defendant asserted that the available population should
be limited to "those blacks living in the immediate Houston area."' 43  The
court held that the geographic limitation suggested by the defendant ignored
"the recognized mobility of today's black labor force." 44 In another case45
the Ninth Circuit precluded the defendant from arguing on appeal that the
city of Seattle did 'not constitute the entire relevant geographic area because
the employer made no objection to its use at the time of trial.
As an illustration of the importance and the difficulty of formulating
precise standards for the selection of the geographic boundaries of the
available population, the 1970 Census of Population and Housing 46 indi-
cates that Blacks comprise 15.9 percent of the Dallas, Texas, Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA); 16.6 percent of the total population
of Dallas County, Texas; and 24.9 percent of the total population of the city
of Dallas.47 Moreover, the Dallas, Texas, SMSA contains several metropol-
itan areas and incorporated subdivisions, each having a relatively small
percentage of Blacks in comparison to the percentage of Blacks who reside in
the city of Dallas. The Dallas, Texas, SMSA is further divided into census
tracts of unequal geographic size and population. A review of the census
tracts reveals that some have almost no Black residents, while other tracts
have a Black population which approaches 100 percent. 48
The labor force of a particular employer having a facility located in the
Dallas, Texas, SMSA may be drawn entirely from persons residing in the
SMSA or a particular geographic segment of the SMSA. Evidence of the
composition of an employer's work force may reflect no significant difference
between the percentage of persons hired or promoted and the percentage of
such persons in the Dallas, Texas, SMSA; however, a significant difference
may exist between the percentage of persons hired and promoted and the
percentage of persons residing in the city of Dallas. The case law provides
no ready answer to this dilemma.
Despite the inherent difficulty in establishing standards for selecting the
available population on a geographic basis, the uncertainty of the mobility
theory espoused by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson provides no guidance for
courts or litigants in subsequent proceedings, and, therefore, has little to
recommend it.
Any standard formulated for the geographic selection of the available
population should be identifiable by persons charged with the responsibility
of compliance with the equal opportunity laws. The standard should also be
sufficiently flexible to permit the promotion of equal employment opportuni-
42. 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
43. Id. at 1371.
44. Id.
45. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 550 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
46. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: 1970
CENSUS TRACTS, FINAL REPORT PHC (1) -52, Dallas, Texas, SMSA.




ty through the eradication of discriminatory employment practices. Volun-
tarism must be encouraged if the objective of integrating the American labor
force is to be achieved. In selecting the geographic area to be used in
defining the available population, the initial focus should be upon the
employment characteristics of the particular employer under consideration.
Relevant considerations include the general nature of the business enterprise,
the type of position offered potential employees, the distance potential
employees will be required to travel to fulfill their employment obligations,
the geographic location of the employer's facility or facilities, and the
number of employees used in the defendant's business.
Of these factors, the distance which an employee is willing to travel in
order to seek employment is probably the most significant factor in determin-
ing the geographic extent of the area selected. Analysis of a particular
employer's actual work force should provide reliable evidence of the distance
that potential workers will be willing to travel in order to secure and hold a
position with the employer.
In the absence of a showing that a particular employer, employment
agency, or labor organization imposes restrictions upon the geographic
distance which an employee may travel to seek employment, a determination
of the size and shape of the geographic area constituting the available labor
market may be accomplished by ascertaining the area from which the
current employees or labor union members are drawn. This process will
involve, as a first step, the ascertainment of the maximum area required to
account for at least 80 percent 49 of the employer's actual work force.
Second, location of the particular facility in the actual geographic area
should be determined. From this information, a hypothetical geographic
area should be constructed by enclosing all census tracts which are of equal
distance from the employer's facility as the census tracts comprising the
actual geographic area. Third, the hypothetical geographic area should be
superimposed upon the actual geographic area to determine the extent to
which the two areas are congruent. Fourth, if the actual geographic area
and the hypothetical geographic areas are not congruent, a comparison of the
racial configuration of the hypothetical geographic area with the racial
configuration of the actual geographic area should be made. If a disparity
exists, it will result from the addition to the actual geographic area of a
census tract containing a different percentage of minority group members
than the actual census tracts in the geographic area. Assuming potential
minority employees are willing to travel as far as non-minority employees to
secure employment, the party arguing for the use of the actual geographic
area should be required to explain why the actual geographic area differs
from the hypothetical one. Fifth, if the hypothetical geographic area and
the actual geographic area are congruent, but the employer has an estab-
49. The selection of an 80% figure is based upon a conclusion that certain
employees probably behave uncharacteristically in terms of the distance they are willing
to commute. It is asserted that the natural labor market will be identified with sufficient




lished policy of restricting minority hiring to a particular geographic region
immediately adjacent to his facility, the employer should be required to
demonstrate that the residence requirement is job related and necessary to
the promotion of legitimate business needs.50  In other words, where it
can be shown that the employer has artificially limited the labor force
from which he selects applicants on a geographic basis, the discrimination
producing limitation should be justified as a matter of business necessity.
Otherwise, if a party contends that a different geographic area should be
utilized, that party should have the burden of demonstrating objective
reasons why the area is inappropriate for consideration as the employer's
natural geographic region.
The proposed five-point formula has several advantages. It will cause
litigants and courts to consider an employer's overall employment conduct in
the context of the actual geographic labor market served. The proposed
formula recognizes that all employers do not draw employees from the entire
population of a state or region. Because the test is based on existing
practices and is not impossible to administer, it permits an employer to know
what is expected of him on a performance basis.
This proposal does have limitations. It assumes that non-minority persons
are willing to travel as far for employment as minority applicants, when, in
fact, minority applicants may, as a matter of necessity, be willing to travel
greater distances. The proposed formula may call for the inclusion of "lily
white" census tracts having inhabitants who are not interested in the
employer's job-offerings, thereby diluting the minority percentage of the
available population. A census tract by census tract consideration of the
labor force will, however, cause litigants and courts to focus upon the
composition of the employer's particular labor force. The proposed formula
is certainly no panacea for the myriad of problems in this area; nevertheless,
it is substantially less haphazard than current practices, and offers employers
better notice than other proposals, 5 ' while, at the same time, facilitating ease
of administration.
B. Age and Sex Limitations
Virtually no attention has been given to the use of other criteria for
defining the available population. In Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co.,5 2 the employer contended that the age group 16 to 24 years should
have been utilized in determining the racial configuration of the available
population. The court rejected this suggestion.53  Presumably, limitations
based on sex would have also been rejected.
50. Thus the test will be consistent with the result reached in Johnson v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
51. For another suggested formula see Blumrosen, supra note 17, at 689-90. Profes-
sor Blumrosen advocates a "catch up" formula which would require employers to
increase minority employment in order to achieve existing utilization rates.
52. 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
53. "The potential labor force cannot be limited to one particular age group." Id.
at 1371. The court cited the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
34 (1970), in support of its conclusion.
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In Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638,54 however, the Second
Circuit took a more plausible position than the view expressed in Johnson.
Analyzing 'the 30 percent remedial goal selected by the trial court,55 the
Second Circuit noted that the membership of the labor organization was not
drawn from the entire population. The court indicated that the statistics
showed that "19.79% of the total work force over 16 years of age in the area
over which the Union has jurisdiction consisted of black and Puerto Rican
males." 56 The Second Circuit recognized that under the provisions of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act not all discrimination based on age
is unlawful.5 7 Moreover, premised upon the concept that "the court should
be guided by the most precise standards and statistics available in view of
the delicate constitutional balance that must be struck . . . between the
elimination of discriminatory effects, which is permissible, and the
impermissible involvement of the court in unjustifiable 'reverse racial
discrimination,' "58 the approach taken in Rios is extremely persuasive. The
Second Circuit also rejected the mobility concept, espoused in Johnson, and
characterized it as an unlawful attempt to maintain a future non-white
percentage.59
It is sensible for courts to consider that age and sex related restrictions
inherent in the type of position offered may affect the definition of the
available population. For example, census data reflects that the total male
labor force, 16 years of age and older, residing in Dallas County, Texas, is
353,984, 60 while the total Black male labor force, 16 years of age and older
residing in Dallas County, Texas, is 46,532.61 Consequently, Black males
comprise only 13 percent of the available male labor force, 16 years of age
and older, in Dallas County, Texas. A persuasive argument for the use of
the 13 percent figure as the measuring standard, rather than the 16.6 percent
figure derived from overall population statistics, 62 can be made. All age
limitations will not run afoul of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.63
Moreover, the employer may be able to justify exclusion of one sex from
the available population by showing that all persons of that sex are simply
voluntarily not in the market for valid reasons. 4
54. 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
55. 360 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
56. 501 F.2d at 633. The court stated that it was permissible to exclude women
because they never sought to become steamfitters. Males under 18 years of age were
customarily excluded from the union and the apprenticeship programs as a result of their
age.
57. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970),
generally prohibits employment discrimination by an employer, employment agency, or
labor organization against individuals who are at least 40 years of age but less than 65
years of age unless age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the particular business or where the differentiation is based on
reasonable factors other than age. Id. §§ 623, 631.
58. 501 F.2d at 633.
59. Id.
60. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 46, at P-69.
61. Id. at P-145.
62. See notes 46-49 supra and accompanying text.
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
64. See note 56 supra. Women present special problems in the area of employment
discrimination. While it is apparent that all women are not in the market for certain
positions for which they may be physically qualified, population data is of little utility in
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C. Other Limiting Factors
Courts and litigants may properly make use of other factors in
identifying the available population. While this technique has not been used
with frequency, Badillo v. Dallas County Community Action Committee,
Inc.,65 is illustrative. The case involved a class action brought in behalf of
Spanish-surnamed Americans against a non-profit corporation implementing
the Economic Opportunity Act of 19646 programs in Dallas County, Texas.
The plaintiffs contended that the employment pattern of the defendant-
employer should be considered in the context of available population data
showing that for every Spanish-surnamed American in Dallas there are 2.5
Blacks. The court concluded, however, that:
By using percentages and ratios of Black and Mexican-Americans liv-
ing at or below the 'poverty level indexes' established by the Federal
Inter-Agency Committee, we arrive at a far different and more mean-
ingful conclusion . . . . The ratio of poverty level Blacks to Mexican-
Americans-46.8%/9% = 5 to 1-contrasts quite significantly to the
2.5 to 1 result achieved by the plaintiffs' overly broad 'total population'
ratio analysis. 67
The court based its use of the poverty factor on the fact that legitimate
aims and functions of the defendant-employer included the employment of
poor persons.6 8 The conclusion of the court is sound. Moreover, this type
of analysis can be used when an employer offers only low salaried positions
on the theory that currently employed persons making a higher salary are
not properly includible within the available population. Census data contains
much information which can be useful in the process of identifying the
available population. Persons are counted not only by race, age, and sex,
but by occupational and industrial classifications. These factors should be
considered when selecting the available population.
An attempt to formulate workable guidelines for selection of the available
population is overdue. The tentative analysis of the actual labor pool made
by the Second Circuit court in Rios69 should serve as a starting point for
future employment discrimination cases. There is no reason why the
parameters of the available population should be mysterious or why the
maximum level of precision permitted by available population data should
not be the judicial goal.
III. SIGNIFICANT STATISTICAL DISPARITY
After the available population has been selected, the courts must deter-
mine whether the difference (statistical disparity) between the percentage of
deciding questions of the type resolved in Rios. For a different treatment of gender
related qualifications see Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975).
65. 394 F. Supp. 694 (N.D. Tex. 1975). The author served as counsel for
defendant.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2994d (1970).
67. 394 F. Supp. at 708.
68. Id. The case also illustrates how the use of a ratio analysis can be misleading
where more than one minority group is in the available labor market.
69. 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); see notes 54-59 supra and accompanying text.
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the minority group employed and the percentage of the minority group in the
available population is significant. While it may be questioned why any
statistical disparity should be permitted, the disinclination of the courts in
Justice Frankfurter's words to "turn matters that are inherently incommen-
surable into mere matters of arithmetic" 70 is understandable.
However, courts have had an unfortunate tendency to use general terms in
characterizing the extent of the statistical disparity. In United States v.
Hayes International Corp.71 the Fifth Circuit selected the entire population
of Birmingham, Alabama, as the available population. The court found that
population figures revealed that roughly 30 percent of the population of
Birmingham, Alabama, was 'Black, and that at the time the suit was
instituted the defendant employed 918 whites and 6 Blacks in office and
technical positions, and further, that between the date of suit and October
1969 (the last date for which the record revealed information) an additional
285 whites and 14 Blacks were hired in office and technical jobs. The court
concluded that the "lopsided ratios" presented a prima facie case.72  In
Castro v. Beecher73 the court found that an employer having a work force
containing only 3.6 percent Blacks, in the context of an available population
16.3 percent Black, established a prima facie case. Moreoever, cases
indicate that where the defendant employs an extremely small number of
minority employees in the context of an available population containing a
significant percentage of minority group members a prima facie case is
established.74  Thus, the focus of decisions has not been upon the question
of the permissible extent of the disparity.
The courts have made no distinction between the statistical or arithmetical
analysis utilized in cases where a particular practice or policy has been
challenged as discriminatory and cases in which the overall selection process
utilized by the employer has been attacked as discriminatory in effect. For
example, in United States v. Georgia Power Co.,75 another case in which the
employer's requirement that employees have a high school diploma was
challenged, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the requirement "screens out
blacks at a considerably higher rate than whites, because in the 25-44 age
group in the South, 64.7% of white males, 35% of black males, 63% of white
females, and 34.7% of black females have completed high school."'7 6  Al-
though the cases reflect that a showing of a gross statistical disparity is
sufficient,77 the permissible limits remain undefined.
70. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 291 (1950).
71. 456 F.2d 112 (5thCir. 1972).
72. Id. at 120.
73. 459 F.2d 725 (lstCir. 1972).
74. Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 54 (5th Cir. 1974) ("the
statistics in the instant case are overpowering"); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86,
443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
75. 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
76. Id. at 918. The court also stated that the EEOC guidelines which require a
95% level of confidence to validate an employment test which also was under attack
"must be read as setting a desirable goal and not a prerequisite." Id. at 915. See
EEOC's Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(c)(1)
(1974).
77. See also Ochoa v. Monsanto Co., 335 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Tex. 1971), af 'd, 473
F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Theoretically, when courts examine a particular practice, standard, or
policy which has been challenged as a discrimination producing variable in
the employment process, the permissible extent of the disparity should be
small. The fact that an employment practice has a relatively small impact
upon the racial pattern of the work force is irrelevant if it does not arise from
legitimate business necessity. Thus, the practice or policy, if unjustifiable as
a business necessity, should be eradicated. While mathematical exactitude
should not be required,78 the permissible extent of the statistical disparity
should be small where individual practices or policies are examined. 79
IV. REMEDIAL DECREES
The courts have broad, equitable power in formulating remedial decrees
in employment discrimination cases. Federal district courts may establish
goals for the purpose of remedying the effects of past discriminatory
conduct.80 Affirmative relief in numerical terms has been ordered by the
courts. 81  However, formulation of remedial decrees involves the same
difficulties as selection of the available population and the determination of
whether a statistical disparity of significant proportions exists. The use of
numerical standards (e.g., quotas) raises various problems, both constitu-
tional and statutory.8 2
If an employer determines that his employment process has operated in a
discriminatory manner and, therefore, voluntarily decides to institute an
affirmative action program to remedy the effects of past discriminatory
practices, the employer takes the risk that his affirmative action plan may
itself be discriminatory in effect. The problem of reverse discrimination is
confronted. 83  Moreover, where the available population from which the
78. A similar consideration of the statistical data has been made in reapportionment
cases. See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See also Finkelstein, The
Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 338 (1966).
79. Some levels of disparity are too small to indicate a causal relationship. Nor-
mally, statisticians require a 95% degree of confidence. It must be noted, however, that
the 95% level is an arbitrary convention. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d
906, 915 (5th Cir. 1973). The amount or level of uncertainty to be tolerated is a policy
decision. See also Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination
Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. REV. 387 (1975), for a discussion of
the potential application of analysis of variance and regression techniques to employ-
ment discrimination cases.
80. See note 2 supra. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The scholarly commentary in
this area has been substantial. See, e.g., A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE
LAw (1971); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT (1971); Blumrosen, supra note 17; Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59
(1972); Hill, The New Judicial Perception of Employment Discrimination-Litigation
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 COLO. L. REv. 243 (1972); Jones,
The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 341; Note, supra note 6.
81. See United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
82. For a thorough discussion of the quota issue see Blumrosen, supra note 17, at
690-703.
83. Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974).
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employer draws his labor force contains more than one minority group, the
difficulty of formulating remedial decrees and taking voluntary affirmative
action will be further compounded. For example, if an employer finds that
two distinct minority groups are statistically under-represented in his work
force, can the affirmative action plan for remedial decree produce a remedy
which achieves an appropriate goal for one minority group at a different
pace than for the other minority group? Similarly, if the statistical disparity
for one minority group is more disproportionate than for the other, should
the employer be required to address the more serious problem first?
A hypothetical employer who will have 100 job openings in the next
hiring period may have a labor force comprised of 1,000 employees of which
85 percent are white, 7 percent are ,Black, and 8 percent are Spanish-
surnamed, as compared to an available population with a white population
of 74 percent, a Black population of 16 percent, and a Spanish-surnamed
population of 10 percent. May the employer remedy the discriminatory
impact upon the Black population before disposing of the statistical disparity
between the number of Spanish-surnamed Americans in the employment
force and the percentage of the Spanish-surnamed Americans in the availa-
ble population? It could be argued that the remedial action should be
directed toward resolving the more severe problem first. However, if
relatively few or no Spanish-surnamed Americans are employed during the
hiring period in which 100 new employees are hired, a rejected Spanish-
surnamed American may contend that he was rejected on racial grounds
despite his qualifications for the position. 'He is not likely to be satisfied
with the explanation that the employer is focusing upon the Black problem
first. However, the defendant should not be penalized for taking affirmative
action. In fact, the legal system should facilitate attempts on the part of
individual employers to integrate the labor force. Therefore, action which
promotes integration in a statistically demonstrable manner should not be
subject to legal attack.
V. CONCLUSION
The haphazard manner in which the courts have considered the selection
of the available population cries to be rectified. The difficulties inherent in
formulating precise standards and methods for the selection of an available
population makes it all the more necessary for courts to focus attention on
the problem. Voluntary compliance can hardly be expected from employ-
ers, labor organizations, or employment agencies as long as the standard by
which conduct is measured remains vague and ambiguous. The proposed
formula set forth herein8 4 may provide guidance with respect to selection of
the available population in future employment discrimination litigation. The
courts should also formulate reasonable rules of thumb for determining the
permissible extent of a statistical disparity between the percentage of minori-
See generally DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as
moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
84. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
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ty group persons employed and the percentage of minority group persons in
the available population. Where particular practices or policies have been
identified as discrimination producing factors in the employment process only
a de minimis deviation should be permitted. The time for the formulation
of precise standards to be utilized in employment discrimination cases is over-
due. The task is essential to fulfilling the statutory goal of providing equal
employment opportunity to all persons regardless of their race, sex, creed,
or national origin.
